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SEVERE AND ENDURING ANOREXIA NERVOSA IN THE COURT OF 
PROTECTION IN ENGLAND AND WALES 
EMMA CAVE AND JACINTA TAN* 
ABSTRACT 
This article explores legal issues relating to the continuation of in-patient treatment for 
people with severe and enduring Anorexia Nervosa in circumstances where there are 
doubts as to treatment efficacy. In five recent cases, the Court of Protection in England 
and Wales has been asked to consider the capacity and best interests of patients with 
severe and enduring Anorexia Nervosa. Drawing upon international comparisons, this 
article outlines the clinical uncertainties associated with prognosis and treatment and 
evaluates legal assertions surrounding capacity and best interests. It is suggested that 
to ensure palliative management is based on need rather than diagnosis, and that 
capacity is decision- and not disease-specific, a closer alignment is required between 
the focus of any capacity and best interests assessments.  
Three specific recommendations are put forward: Firstly the courts should adopt a 
patient-centred rather than clinician-centred approach to framing the decision that is 
subject to a capacity assessment. Secondly where a patient with Anorexia Nervosa 
lacks capacity, reliance on their stated treatment preferences must be balanced with 
their views and hopes regarding prognosis. The value of different treatment options 
should be assessed in this light. Thirdly given the clinical and ethical uncertainties 
regarding prognosis and appropriateness of treatment, there are dangers in relying on 
the same court-appointed expert in all cases.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
This paper considers medico-legal developments encompassing the treatment of 
people with severe and enduring Anorexia Nervosa (referred to in this paper by the 
acronym SEAN). Clinicians have only recently begun to use the term ‘SEAN’.1 There 
is disagreement as to when Anorexia Nervosa might usefully be labelled ‘severe and 
enduring’, what this means in terms of prognosis, and the consequences regarding 
treatment and management that flow from application of the label. This paper focuses 
on ways in which the law has in the past, and possibly might in future, resolve disputes 
about the care and treatment of patients with SEAN. There is growing recognition that 
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1 A term used in Mitchison D, Hay P, Engel S, Crosby R, et al. 2013. Assessment of quality of life in 
people with severe and enduring anorexia nervosa: a comparison of generic and specific 
instruments. BMC Psychiatry. 13: 1-9. Also referred to as SEED-AN: see Robinson PH, Kukucska R, 
Guidetti G, Leavey G. 2015. Severe and enduring anorexia nervosa (SEED-AN): a qualitative study of 
patients with 20+ years of anorexia nervosa. European Eating Disorders Review 23(4): 318-26.  
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treatment of SEAN can in some cases be considered futile,2 in which case there is no 
legal basis to impose it on patients who cannot or will not consent. Patients with SEAN 
do not have a disorder of consciousness and can usually articulate their current views. 
This paper considers what reliance should be placed on those views both in 
determining whether a patient (who will be called ‘P’ in this paper) with SEAN has 
capacity and, where capacity is lacking, assessing P’s best interests.    
In England and Wales, section 1(5) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 requires that 
where a person lacks capacity, decisions made on their behalf must be in their best 
interests. Section 4 sets out factors that must be considered in this assessment and 
whilst there is no legislative hierarchy within its provisions, the facts of each case will 
determine that some factors have particular weight. The UK Supreme Court decision 
of Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James (Aintree) established 
that best interests must be determined from the perspective of the person who lacks 
capacity.3 Notwithstanding this development, the Law Commission reported in 2017 
that the legal framework insufficiently prioritises the person’s wishes and feelings.4 
Decision-makers should not merely ‘consider’ wishes and feelings, but should 
‘ascertain’ them as far as is practicable and give them weight, departing from them 
only where it is necessary and proportionate to do so.5 We argue that legal 
developments on the treatment of patients with SEAN fail to take a sufficiently patient-
centred approach. 
The article begins with a brief clinical account of treatment options for Anorexia 
Nervosa and the difficulties in recognising, labelling and treating severe and enduring 
cases. We then examine a series of five recent legal cases in which the respective 
judges advanced compassionate evaluations of whether compulsory treatment of 
patients with SEAN and other conditions should continue. The cases were heard in 
the Court of Protection, which has jurisdiction over financial and welfare matters for 
people who lack mental capacity. There follows an analysis of capacity, best interests 
and futility, and a proposal for greater alignment of the capacity and best interests 
assessments. The authors respectfully make three recommendations for future cases 
involving patients with SEAN. Though focussed on the Court of Protection, the 
recommendations flow from an analysis of universal principles of human rights and 
have resonance for international jurisdictions:  
(1) The courts should take a patient-centred rather than clinician-centred approach to 
framing the decision that is subject to a capacity assessment. Whilst Anorexia Nervosa 
sometimes affects decision-making capacity in relation to nutrition, this does not 
preclude a finding that the patient has sufficient capacity regarding end of life 
decisions.  
(2) Where a patient with Anorexia Nervosa lacks capacity, reliance upon their stated 
treatment preferences must be balanced with their views and hopes regarding 
prognosis. The value of treatment options should be assessed in this light.  
                                            
2 Westmoreland P, Mehler PS. 2016. Caring for Patients with Severe and Enduring Eating Disorders 
(SEED): Certification, Harm Reduction, Palliative Care, and the Question of Futility. Journal of 
Psychiatric Practice Jul;22(4): 313-20. 
3 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, [45]. 
4 Law Commission. 2017. Mental capacity and deprivation of liberty. Law Com No 372, 14.7. 
5 Ibid 14.16 – 14.18 and rec 40; Draft Bill, cl 8(2) and (3). 
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(3) Given clinical and ethical uncertainties regarding prognosis and appropriateness 
of treatment, courts should appoint experts from a broad pool. There are dangers of 
relying on the same appointed expert in all cases.  
II. SEVERE AND ENDURING ANOREXIA NERVOSA 
Anorexia Nervosa is a serious and potentially life threatening mental health condition. 
Whilst it typically affects adolescents, it can also affect children and people into middle 
age,6 and, whilst many people who have Anorexia Nervosa are female, it also affects 
men. Voluntary treatment on an outpatient basis is often effective, but more serious 
cases may be referred to and treated by specialist eating disorder clinics and some of 
these people require hospitalisation. There is variation in the treatment and 
management of eating disorders within the NHS, there are chronic bed shortages7 and 
patients are not always admitted to the appropriate treatment setting.8  
Where P’s health or survival is threatened, P may be detained under sections 2 or 3 
of the Mental Health Act 1983 (MHA). Section 63 of the MHA allows medical treatment 
for the disorder, without consent, including artificial nutrition.9 The most straightforward 
and common method of refeeding a patient is by gradually increasing the number of 
calories in an oral diet under supervision. For most patients, the requirement and 
expectation to eat, especially under the MHA, is sufficient. However, a small proportion 
of patients are unable to eat normally and require medically invasive feeding such as 
enteral nutrition, tube feeding. This carries its own risks, such as accidental feeding 
into the lung. This method of fluid and nutrition intake is sometimes acceptable to, 
preferred or even welcomed by patients with Anorexia Nervosa, as it limits choice and 
the burden of responsibility by bypassing the physical act of eating.10 For others, 
however, there can be efforts to refuse, manipulate or remove the tubes, which is 
dangerous. If resistance is sustained, this can lead to increasing conflict and restraint 
which consequently can then raise the spectre of forced feeding under physical 
restraint or pharmacological sedation.  
Refeeding through any means can lead to complications. Sustained malnutrition leads 
to deficiencies of both macronutrients (such as carbohydrates and protein) and 
micronutrients (such as vitamins and minerals). Refeeding rapidly by any means 
without proper medical supervision can lead to potentially life-threatening metabolic 
                                            
6 Micali N, Martini MG, Thomas JJ, et al. 2017. Lifetime and 12-month prevalence of eating disorders 
amongst women in mid-life: a population-based study of diagnoses and risk factors. BMC Medicine 
[Online] 15:12. See http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12916-016-0766-4.  
7 See for example National Health Executive. 2016. National bed shortages force English anorexia 
patients to Scotland for care. 12th December. See http://www.nationalhealthexecutive.com/Health-
Care-News/bed-shortages-force-english-anorexia-patients-to-scotland-for-care. And see proposals to 
tackle out-of-area placements for children and young people in Mental Health Taskforce. 2016. Five 
Year Forward View for Mental Health. See https://www.england.nhs.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/02/Mental-Health-Taskforce-FYFV-final.pdf. 
8 The Royal Colleges of Psychiatrists, 2014. Physicians and Pathologists. MARSIPAN: Management of 
Really Sick Patients with Anorexia Nervosa. 2nd Edn. CR189, p 6. See 
http://www.rcpsych.ac.uk/files/pdfversion/CR189.pdf.  
9 B v Croydon District HA (1992) 22 BMLR 13, CA; Re KB (adult) (mental patient: medical treatment) 
(1994) 19 BMLR 144; Riverside Health NHS Trust v Fox [1994] 1 FLR 614; Office of the Public 
Guardian. 2013 (updated 2016). MCA Code of Practice, 9.26. 
10 See Tan J, Stewart A, Fitzpatrick R, Hope T. 2010. Attitudes of patients with anorexia nervosa to 
compulsory treatment and coercion. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 33(1): 13-19. 
[2017] International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 
7 
changes, such as ‘refeeding syndrome'.11 Medical opinion differs as to the 
acceptability and efficacy of tube feeding voluntary patients. In some patients with 
Anorexia Nervosa, non-oral nutrition under varying degrees of compulsion may be the 
only option to maintain life. Naso-gastric tubes can be passed through the nose into 
the stomach; this is the commonest form of tube feeding but is only recommended for 
short periods. There are other forms of tube feeding such as Percutaneous 
Endoscopic Gastrostomy (PEG) feeding where a tube is surgically inserted into the 
stomach; or intravenous nutrition.  
Eating disorders have the highest mortality rate of psychiatric disorders.12 Approaches 
and treatments for Anorexia Nervosa are constantly evolving,13 but severe Anorexia 
Nervosa is amongst the most challenging mental health conditions to treat.14 Guidance 
from the Royal College of Psychiatrists15 focuses on reducing fatal outcomes, 
recognising that they sometimes result from ‘inappropriate palliative care’.16 In 1997 
the media reported the death of Nikki Hughes who had Anorexia Nervosa, stating that 
the NHS Trust treating her was given legal advice that her refusal of treatment could 
not be overridden.17 The MHA Commission issued guidance to the contrary,18 but 
reports of underfunding and confusion about the legal position persist.19 Some patients 
are not given access to the right support at the right time. It is noteworthy that neither 
the 200420 nor the replacement 2017 guidance21 issued by The National Institute for 
Health and Care Excellence (NICE) comments on the relevance of palliative 
management of Anorexia Nervosa, the emphasis being on timely and consistent 
treatment. As we shall see, future guidance may need to respond to developments in 
11 NICE. 2006. Nutrition support in adults. Clinical guideline CG32.  
12 Arcelus J, Mitchell AJ, Wales J et al. 2011. Mortality rates in patients with Anorexia Nervosa and 
other eating disorders: A Meta-Analysis of 36 Studies. Archives of General Psychiatry 68: 724-31. 
13 See for example Park RJ, Singh I, Pike AC, Tan JO. 2017. Deep Brain Stimulation in Anorexia 
Nervosa: Hope for the Hopeless or Exploitation of the Vulnerable? The Oxford Neuroethics Gold 
Standard Framework. Frontiers in Psychiatry. 8: 44. 
14 Steinhausen HC. 2002. The outcome of anorexia nervosa in the 20th century. American Journal of 
Psychiatry 159:1284-93; Goddard E, Hibbs R, Raenker S, et al. 2013. A multi-centre cohort study of 
short term outcomes of hospital treatment for anorexia nervosa in the UK. BMC Psychiatry 13: 287. 
15 Royal College of Psychiatrists. 2014. Management of Really Sick Patients with Anorexia Nervosa’ 
(MARSIPAN) CR198. And see Junior MARSIPAN: Management of Really Sick Patients under 18 with 
Anorexia Nervosa. CR168. 
16 Ibid, p 30. 
17 See Cooper G. 1997. Doctors get right to force-feed anorexic patients. The Independent. 5 August. 
18 Mental Health Act Commission. 2004. Guidance on the Treatment of Anorexia Nervosa under the 
Mental Health Act 1983. See http://www.seedeatingdisorders.org.uk/pdfs/user/F3774357-49CE-5BCB-
F9BB-22ECC4C430E5.pdf.  
19 See The Masked AMHP. 2010. Anorexia, the Mental Health Act – and Kayleigh. See 
http://themaskedamhp.blogspot.co.uk/2010/12/anorexia-mental-health-act-and-kayleigh.html; BBC 
News. 2004. Anorexia death to be investigated. 4 February: See 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/health/3460189.stm; Daily Mail. 2010. ‘Skeletal’ male chef suffering from 
anorexia and bulimia died while on daily diet of just two crackerbreads. 29 June: See 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1290635/Skeletal-male-chef-suffering-anorexia-bulimia-died-
daily-diet-just-crackerbreads.html; Tyler J. 2016. Eating disorders nurse died weighing 5st after using 
her know-how to hide her own anorexia. Birmingham Mail, 24 October: See 
http://www.birminghammail.co.uk/news/midlands-news/eating-disorders-nurse-died-weighing-
12072468; BBC News. 2017. Anorexic woman's death 'would have been prevented' with better 
treatment. 2 February. See http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-devon-38825643. 
20 NICE. 2004. Eating disorders: core interventions in the treatment and management of anorexia 
nervosa, bulimia nervosa and related eating disorders. Clinical Guideline CG 9.  
21 NICE. 2017. Eating Disorders: Recognition and Treatment. NG69. 
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the classification of Anorexia Nervosa that could lead to a growing acceptance of 
palliative management in the most severe and enduring presentations.  
As outlined above, the responses to treatment for Anorexia Nervosa are varied and 
multi-faceted. Attempts to differentiate between types or stages of Anorexia Nervosa 
are relatively new. The term ‘Severe and Enduring’ has traditionally been reserved for 
certain mental health conditions typically characterised by psychosis but more recently 
has been applied so as to describe a classification of particularly durable Anorexia 
Nervosa.22 Hay and Touyz argue that the conceptualisation of staging models of 
Anorexia Nervosa has utility in assessment and treatment23 but the staging of Anorexia 
Nervosa is not universally accepted24. A variety of labels are used to denote an 
enduring form of Anorexia Nervosa25 and the prognosis for patients who fall into this 
category is under-researched.26  
Ongoing analysis is needed to determine whether ‘staging’ of Anorexia Nervosa might 
or should lead to a greater acceptance of the withdrawal of active treatment in favour 
of purely palliative management of SEAN.27 Questions around the suitability of 
palliative management in severe Anorexia Nervosa are hardly novel,28 but its use has 
traditionally been determined by need rather than diagnosis. More recently, there have 
been calls for the palliative management of cases lasting more than ten years,29 yet a 
recent longitudinal study found that around half of those who had not recovered from 
Anorexia Nervosa at 9 years, had recovered at 22 years.30 From a clinical perspective 
at least, the study indicates that routine palliative management of SEAN is 
inappropriate.31 It also raises questions surrounding the ongoing treatment of the third 
of patients studied who were not recovered at 22 years. There is little data on treatment 
efficacy in such cases. Nor is it clear that clinicians can distinguish the longstanding 
patients who eventually recover from those who will not. Some argue that treatment 
                                            
22 Hay PI, Touyz S. 2015. Treatment of patients with severe and enduring eating disorders. Current 
Opinion in Psychiatry 28(6): 473-7. 
23 Touyz S, Hay P. 2015. Severe and enduring anorexia nervosa (SE-AN): in search of a new paradigm. 
Journal of Eating Disorders 3: 26. 
24 Maguire S, LeGrange D, Surgenor L et al. 2008. Staging anorexia nervosa: conceputalizing illness 
severity. Early Intervention in Psychiatry 2(1): 3-10. 
25 Wildes JE, Forbush KT, Hagen KE et al. Characterizing severe and enduring anorexia nervosa: An 
empirical approach. International Journal of Eating Disorders 50(4):389-397; Broomfield C, Stedal K, 
Touyz S, Rhodes P. 2017. Labeling and defining severe and enduring anorexia nervosa: A systematic 
review and critical analysis. International Journal of Eating Disorders 50(6): 611-623; 2017.  
26 Hay PJ, Touyz S, Sud R. 2012. Treatment for severe and enduring anorexia nervosa: a review. Aust 
N Z J Psychiatry. 46: 1136–44. And see Touyz S, Le Grange D, Hay P, Lacey H (Eds). 2016. Managing 
Severe and Enduring Anorexia Nervosa: A Clinician's Guide. London: Taylor and Francis. 
27 Treasure J, Stein D, Maguire S. 2015. Has the time come for a staging model to map the course of 
eating disorders from high risk to severe enduring illness? An examination of the evidence. Early 
Intervention in Psychiatry 9: 173–184. 
28 Williams CJ. 1998. Does palliative care have a role in treatment of anorexia nervosa? BMJ 317(7152): 
195–197. 
29 See Steinhausen HC. 2002. The outcome of anorexia nervosa in the 20th century. American Journal 
of Psychiatry 159:1284-93. 
30 Eddy KT, Tabri N, Thomas JJ, et al. 2016. Recovery from Anorexia Nervosa and Bulimia Nervosa at 
22-Year follow-up. Journal of Clinical Psychiatry Dec 20. doi: 10.4088/JCP.15m10393: 31.4% of 
anorectic patients recovered in 9 years and 62.8% in 22 years. 
31 The study focussed on patients with DSM-III-R/DSM-IV anorexia nervosa or bulimia nervosa. 
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should endure providing it is not rendered unviable by co-morbidities32 while others 
adopt the stance that SEAN can be a terminal condition, in which case palliative 
management is appropriate.33 Depending on the viewpoint, compulsory treatment 
against P’s wishes can thus be viewed as either ethically imperative or ethically 
unjustifiable.  
Moves to reclassify some cases of SEAN as terminal are influenced by human rights 
developments protecting rights to individual autonomy and freedom from 
discrimination. The five cases discussed below each referred to the European 
Convention on Human Rights, the jurisprudence of which is influenced by the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 2006 (CRPD),34 though 
disappointingly the cases do not expressly reference the CRPD. The UN CRPD 
prohibits discrimination based on disability (article 4); states that the existence of 
disability does not justify deprivation of liberty (article 14); and protects the rights of 
persons with disability to ‘enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all 
aspects of life’ (article 12). Although the UK ratified the Convention in 2009, it remains 
unincorporated in English law, and it clashes with aspects of the MHA 1983 and the 
Mental Capacity Act 2005, that apply in England and Wales.35  
The paternalistic ‘compassionate intervention’ model36 that sanctions compulsory 
refeeding for the good of the patient, gained credence on the basis of evidence that 
many patients who were coerced are later grateful for the intervention.37 This model is 
losing force.38 Draft NICE guidance charted a withdrawal of ‘moral authority’ for 
compulsory refeeding and the dawn of a ‘more lenient approach’.39 This development 
is not restricted to eating disorders. Consider recent proclamations that mental health 
units should supply sterile cutting equipment to some patients who self-harm on the 
basis that compulsion can exacerbate the problem. Sullivan argues for a harm 
minimisation model that recognises the value of supporting autonomy and 
independence.40 As in cases of SEAN, the tensions are multi-faceted. Clinicians must 
                                            
32 Collins Lyster-Mench L. 2016. There is no such thing as ‘late terminal anorexia-nervosa’. Huffington 
Post 12 August. See http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/there-is-no-such-thing-as-late-terminal-
anorexia-nervosa_us_5849c4e9e4b07d4bc0fa2605.  
33 See Schmidt S. 2016. Anorexic woman weighing 69 pounds has a right to starve, court rules. 
Washington Post 22 November: See https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-
mix/wp/2016/11/22/anorexic-woman-weighing-69-pounds-has-a-right-to-starve-court-
rules/?utm_term=.08d50a6ef4ca, discussed below. AG was said to have ‘late terminal anorexia 
nervosa’. 
34 See for example Glor v Switzerland (App. No.13444/04) (30 April 2009) and, more recently, Çam v 
Turkey [2016] ECHR 206 (23 February 2016). 
35 See Szmukler G, Daw R, Callard F. 2014. Mental health law and the UN Convention on the rights of 
persons with disabilities. International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 37(3): 245-252. 
36 Faith KE. 2002. Addressing Issues of Autonomy and Beneficence in the Treatment of Eating 
Disorders. National Eating Disorder Information Centre. See http://nedic.ca/sites/default/files/ 
addressing-issues-beneficience-and-autonomy-treatment-eating-disorders.pdf.  
37 Watson T, Bowers W and Anderson A. 2000. Involuntary Treatment of Eating Disorders. American 
Journal of Psychiatry 157: 1806-1810.  
38 Law Commission. 2017. Mental Capacity and Deprivation of Liberty. Law Com No 372, 13.18. 
39 NICE. Draft: Eating Disorders - Recognition and Treatment. [GID-CGWAVE0703] p 31; See resulting 
guidance: NICE. 2017. Eating Disorders: Recognition and Treatment. NG69.  
40 Sullivan PJ. 2017. Should healthcare professionals sometimes allow harm? The case of self-injury. 
Journal of Medical Ethics. Published Online First: 09 February 2017. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2015-
103146. Contrast Pickard H, Pearce S. 2017. Balancing costs and benefits: a clinical perspective does 
not support a harm minimisation approach for self-injury outside of community settings. Journal of 
Medical Ethics. Published Online First: 09 February 2017. doi: 10.1136/medethics-2017-104152. 
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balance the patient’s preferences against their insight into the condition; the value of 
independence and control against compulsion; long-term against short-term harm 
minimisation; and management against cure. A plurality of views exists as to the 
prognosis and treatment options of patients with SEAN and yet in the five cases 
discussed in the next section, the court called each time on the specialist advice of the 
same expert: Dr Tyrone Glover. Whilst there is nothing whatsoever to suggest that this 
advice was not of the highest quality and integrity, it is respectfully submitted that the 
court would benefit from consideration of a broader range of clinical viewpoints. 
III. THE CASES OF E, L, X, W AND Z 
All of the five cases involved female patients over the age of 1841 who had suffered 
from Anorexia Nervosa for more than 14 years.42 In each case, a determination of the 
patients’ best interests was made on the basis that they lacked capacity to decide.  
Only in Re E did the court decide that in-patient treatment should continue. This was 
also the only case in which the judge referred to the term ‘withdrawal of life-sustaining 
treatment’.43 Nonetheless, in the cases of L, X, W and Z, none of the judges avoided 
the reality that they were in effect choosing between end of life options.44 
In the cases of L, X, W and Z, declarations were granted to the respective NHS Trusts 
allowing in-patient treatment to be withdrawn. The judges found there to be no 
available treatment offering a realistic prospect of significantly extending the patients’ 
lifespans.45 It was in each patient’s best interests to be discharged from the MHA 
framework46 in the hope that P would engage in voluntary treatment. Because that 
hope was negligible, the judges focussed on the inefficacy of continued compulsory 
treatment, considering the significant psychological and physical burdens it would 
entail. The patients were likely to resist refeeding by naso-gastric tube, so that restraint 
would be required. Taking each case in turn:  
Re E (medical treatment: anorexia) [2012]47 
E was being treated in a palliative care setting, as previous treatment attempts had 
failed to affect a cure. The Official Solicitor and local authority sought a declaration 
that E be moved to an intensive care unit for refeeding. E’s parents disagreed, arguing 
that palliative management was what E wanted. Peter Jackson J held that E lacked 
capacity to make decisions about life-sustaining treatment and that it was in her best 
                                            
41 E was 32; L was 29; X a ‘young woman’; W was 28; and Z was 46. 
42 E for 21 years; L for 15 years, X for 14, W for 20 and Z for 31 years. 
43 Re E (medical treatment: anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP), [5].  
44 The NHS Trust v L and Others [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP), [52] per Eleanor King J; A NHS Foundation 
Trust v Ms X (Official Solicitor) [2014] EWCOP 35, [44] per Cobb J; Re W (medical treatment: anorexia) 
[2016] EWCOP 13, [54] per Peter Jackson J; Cheshire & Wirral Ptnr NHS FT v Z [2016] EWCOP 56, 
[11] per Hayden J. 
45 The NHS Trust v L and Others [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP), [1], [7] per Eleanor King J; A NHS 
Foundation Trust v Ms X (Official Solicitor) [2014] EWCOP 35, [43] per Cobb J; Re W (medical 
treatment: anorexia) [2016] EWCOP 13, [49] per Peter Jackson J; Cheshire & Wirral Ptnr NHS FT v Z 
[2016] EWCOP 56 [9] per Hayden J. 
46 The procedural issues this raises are beyond the scope of this article but see Cheshire & Wirral Ptnr 
NHS FT v Z [2016] EWCOP 56, [21] per Hayden J.  
47 [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP). 
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interests to be forcibly re-fed. The 20-30%48 chance of a full recovery that a 12-month 
(plus) programme of treatment might bring, justified any violation of her rights under 
Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. There was still hope 
for E:  
We only live once – we are born once and we die once – and the difference between life and 
death is the biggest difference we know. E is a special person, whose life is of value. She does 
not see it that way now, but she may in future.49 
Sadly, there was evidence in Re E that E took pride in being ‘the most treatment-
resistant patient they had ever had’.50 In A NHS Foundation Trust v X it was noted 
that, two years on, E was still receiving treatment as an in-patient.51 
E had twice made advance decisions refusing refeeding. The validity of an advance 
decision turns on evidence that the maker had capacity at the relevant time. A doctor 
had opined that E had the requisite capacity, but soon after felt that E was not 
expressing a consistent wish to die. In an apparent reversal of the burden of proof, 
Peter Jackson J concluded that, on the balance of probabilities, E lacked capacity at 
the time she signed the advance decision.52  
In its manner of presentation to the court, Re E differs from the other four cases. In Re 
E the Official Solicitor proposed continued treatment whereas in the other cases, the 
request was specifically about withdrawal of compulsory in-patient treatment. The 
open-endedness of the application in Re E did not go unnoticed. Peter Jackson J 
made clear that the court should not ‘be drawn into theorising’ but rather should be 
presented with available treatment options.53 The Court of Protection is reluctant to 
decide hypothetical questions and proceedings are futile if there is no clinician willing 
to carry out proposed treatment.54 Re E is the only case where continued in-patient 
treatment was recommended. It is quite possible that the following four cases were 
precipitated by the Re E decision.  
The NHS Trust v L and Others [2012]55 
In The NHS Trust v L, L had spent around 90% of her life as an inpatient. She was 
physically frail and in end-stage organ failure. The evidence was that feeding via naso-
gastric tube would require sedation and ‘the likelihood of death if force-feeding were 
to be attempted on a chemically sedated basis would run at close to 100%’.56 A robust 
case for withdrawal of coercive treatment was made out on the basis that continuing 
treatment would lead to psychological distress and quite likely result in death.  
48 Ibid [72], [90]. 
49 Ibid [137], per Peter Jackson J. 
50 Ibid, [128]. 
51 A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X (Official Solicitor) [2014] EWCOP 35, [56]. 
52 Re E (medical treatment: anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP), [135]. See discussion in Richardson 
G. 2013. Mental capacity in the shadow of suicide: What can the law do? International Journal of Law 
in Context. 9(1): 87-105. 
53 Re E (medical treatment: anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP), [41]. 
54 AVS v NHS Foundation Trust and B PCT [2010] EWCA Civ 7. 
55 [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP).  
56 Ibid, [44]. 
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A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X (Official Solicitor) [2014]57 
X had a slightly better medical prognosis than L. Cobb J recognised that: 
The particular tragedy of the case is that there is a possibility even now that Ms X could live a 
long and happy life, but that chance is very small indeed – less than 5%. Moreover, I am satisfied 
that she does not want to die.58 
X’s life expectancy would be normal if she could stop drinking and resume a good 
diet.59 However, alcoholism and severe liver disease posed additional risks in relation 
to any coercive refeeding regime, which resulted in a paradox: ‘[T]hat if I were to 
compel treatment, I may (and the doctors argue strongly that I would) be doing no 
more than facilitating or accelerating the termination of her life.’60 Some of the risks 
associated with refeeding flowed from X’s likely reaction to it. One possibility was that 
she would increase alcohol intake, another was that (if denied alcohol) she would 
attempt suicide. 
Re W (medical treatment: anorexia) [2016]61 
In W’s case, the objections to refeeding under sedation focussed less on the chances 
that W would not survive the intervention and more on the ethical dilemmas inherent 
in a coercive regime: 
The first proposal was for W to be re-fed under sedation. This would involve her being rendered 
unconscious for up to 6 months and fed by tube until she gained a BMI of 17.5. This proposal 
has not been pursued, rightly in my view. It is an unprecedented step and there were numerous 
potential objections about its ethical basis, W's objections, the unavailability of clinicians to carry 
it out, and the improbability that it would bring about sustainable change.62 
Recall that the same judge, Peter Jackson J, also presided in the case of E where it 
was accepted that: 
She would be stabilised and fed with calorific material via a naso-gastric tube or a PEG tube 
inserted through her stomach wall. Any resistance would be overcome by physical restraint or by 
chemical sedation. The process would continue for a year or more.63 
Clearly refeeding under sedation is not itself ‘unprecedented’.64 The key difference 
between Re E and Re W for Peter Jackson J, was that for W all available treatment 
options, in a wide range of treatment settings had been tried to no avail.65 In E’s case, 
conversely, the evidence was that treatment options were not exhausted. Treatment 
could not at that point be considered futile.66 
                                            
57 [2014] EWHC 35 (COP).  
58 Ibid, [11]. 
59 Ibid, [24]. 
60 Ibid, [42]. 
61 [2016] EWCOP 13.  
62 Ibid, [20]. 
63 Re E (medical treatment: anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP), [44]. 
64 See Royal College of Psychiatrists. 2014. Management of Really Sick Patients with Anorexia 
Nervosa’ (MARSIPAN) CR198, Appendix 6. 
65 Re W (medical treatment: anorexia) [2016] EWCOP 13, [18]. 
66 Re E (medical treatment: anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP), [138]. ‘I would not overrule her wishes 
if further treatment was futile, but it is not. Although extremely burdensome to E, there is a possibility 
that it will succeed.’ 
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Re W concerns clinical futility of a different nature to The NHS Trust v L and A NHS 
Foundation Trust v X.  It was enough in Re W that W’s Anorexia Nervosa was severe, 
unremitting and enduring. These factors indicated that a cure could not be hoped for.67 
Re W is thus the closest indication that the court might be amenable to the views that 
SEAN can potentially be considered terminal, compulsory treatment may be futile, and 
palliative management may be clinically appropriate. 
Cheshire & Wirral Ptnr NHS FT v Z [2016]68  
The risks of harm associated with a coercive refeeding regime were considerable in 
Z’s case, though the evidence that it could lead to death was weaker than in L and X’s 
cases. The court differentiated between physical and chemical restraint, which posed 
different psychological and physical risks. Because Z had osteoporosis, physical 
restraint would probably result in musculoskeletal injury.69 Chemical sedation posed a 
‘"very high risk" of respiratory or cardiac arrest as well as the risk that the sedation 
option could lead to some other iatrogenic cause of death’.  
The next sections outline risks that flow from the potential interpretations of this series 
of cases. One is that clinicians might rely on the outcome of the cases without due 
consideration of the nuanced judicial examinations of the individual facts. This could 
potentially lead to both assumptions of incapacity in cases of SEAN and overreliance 
on the stated preferences of the patient when considering best interests. In future 
cases, it is argued that more could be done to protect P’s rights, will and preferences.  
IV. CAN PATIENTS WITH SEAN HAVE MENTAL CAPACITY? 
To understand the potential in practice for patients with SEAN to be assumed to lack 
capacity, we must first turn to the principles governing the Mental Capacity Act 2005 
(MCA). The framework of the legislation has been articulated by Peter Jackson J in 
Re E70 in the following terms: 
People with capacity are entitled to make decisions for themselves, including about what they 
will and will not eat, even if their decision brings about their death. The state, here in the form of 
the Court of Protection, is only entitled to interfere where a person does not have the capacity to 
decide for herself. 
By contrast, where a person lacks capacity, there is a duty to make the decision that is in her 
best interests. 
The first question therefore is whether the person has capacity. The second, which can only arise 
if she does not, is what decision is in her best interests. 
In all five cases, the court found that P lacked capacity. Anorexia Nervosa constitutes 
an ‘impairment of, or disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or brain’ so as to satisfy 
section 2(1) of the Mental Capacity Act test. Section 3(1) sets out the second stage of 
the two-part test: 
For the purposes of section 2, a person is unable to make a decision for himself if he is unable— 
                                            
67 Re W (medical treatment: anorexia) [2016] EWCOP 13, [45]. 
68 [2016] EWCOP 56.  
69 Ibid [16]. 
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(a) to understand the information relevant to the decision, 
(b) to retain that information, 
(c) to use or weigh that information as part of the process of making the decision, or 
(d) to communicate his decision (whether by talking, using sign language or any other 
means). 
In assessing P’s capacity, the court is interested not only in the patient’s understanding 
but also the ability to use and weigh the information. The MCA Code recognises that 
section 3(1)(c) concerning the ability to use and weigh information may be particularly 
pertinent to patients with Anorexia Nervosa.71 X was found to be unable to use and 
weigh the information relating to her Anorexia Nervosa, though she retained capacity 
in relation to her decision to imbibe alcohol.72 The evidence was that she could 
understand the information needed to make decisions about alcohol but not about 
food.  
Two concerns about the capacity assessment of patients with Anorexia Nervosa are 
these: First, there is an assumption of incapacity in the terms of the declaration sought. 
In A NHS Foundation Trust v X, for example, the NHS Trust sought a declaration that 
it was not in X’s best interests to subject P to treatment that may prolong life by 
compulsorily detaining and treating her against her wishes. This limited the court’s 
scope to assess capacity, not because they could not refute the Trust’s conclusion 
regarding capacity, but because it framed the decision with respect to which capacity 
is assessed, as one relating to refusal of nutrition. The second concern is articulated 
by Wang, who argues that the application of the MCA in A NHS Foundation Trust v X 
is incompatible with the UN CRPD.73 If the decision was characterised as options 
between choosing a shorter life of better quality and a possibility of full recovery rather 
than simply as a refusal of refeeding, then P might, depending on their ability to 
understand, use and weigh these issues, retain capacity. The narrow focus prevented 
X from judging whether quality or duration of life was more important. The specific 
decision subject to an assessment of capacity was not necessarily whether to refuse 
or accept nutrition, but whether to refuse or accept treatment that X considered futile.  
To focus on the narrow conception of P’s refusal of treatment is, we would suggest, at 
odds with the position taken in the UK Supreme Court decision of Montgomery, a 
leading case on informed consent. The Supreme Court focused on P’s entitlement to 
choose between relevant options74 ‘so that [P] is then in a position to make an informed 
decision’.75 In the words of Lady Hale: 
Most decisions about medical care are not simple yes/no answers. There are choices to be 
made, arguments for and against each of the options to be considered, and sufficient 
information must be given so that this can be done.76  
                                            
71 Office of the Public Guardian. 2013 (updated 2016). MCA Code of Practice, 4.22. 
72 X NHS Trust v T (adult patient: refusal of medical treatment) [2004] EWHC 1279 (Fam), [28] –[30]. 
73 Wang DWL. 2015. Mental Capacity Act, Anorexia Nervosa and the choice between life-prolonging 
treatment and palliative care: A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X. Modern Law Review 78(5); 871-882. 
74 Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [82], [87], [89] per Lords Reed and Kerr. 
75 Ibid, [90] per Lords Reed and Kerr. 
76 Ibid, [109]. 
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The decision around treatment for SEAN is not simply a matter of saying yes or no to 
nutrition and neither should the assessment of capacity be confined to this issue.  
V. CAN PATIENTS WITH ‘SEAN’ GIVE CAPACITOUS REASONS FOR REFUSING 
TREATMENT? 
The last section argued that there are circumstances where the ‘decision’ in relation 
to which capacity is assessed should be the broader decision about quality and 
duration of life rather than the narrow issue of nutrition. If so, it might still be argued 
that the broader decision is strongly influenced by the Anorexia Nervosa, in which case 
it is important to ascertain in each individual case whether there are sufficient 
capacitous reasons to support the refusal of treatment. 
There is authority for the proposition that a distinction should be drawn between cases 
where P cannot make a decision and cases where P’s views are based, in part, on 
rational considerations. In Re SB77, a 37-year-old woman with bipolar disorder was 
detained under section 2 of the MHA. Holman J held that, contrary to expert opinion, 
P retained capacity to elect the termination of her pregnancy at 23 weeks’ gestation. 
Experts agreed that P understood what a termination entailed but was basing the 
decision upon ‘flawed evidence and paranoid beliefs’.78 The evidence was that P 
wanted the baby until the point at which she came off medication (probably to protect 
the baby) and was beset with paranoid thoughts. Her family considered the decision 
unwise, but Holman J made clear that, applying section 1(4) of the MCA, an unwise 
determination cannot be equated with an incapacitous decision. Holman J recognised 
that the views of experts are usually decisive: ‘But those are generally cases in which 
the patient himself or herself is not positively and strongly asserting, and actually giving 
evidence, that he or she has the required capacity.’79 SB was not ‘unable to make a 
decision’. The experts asserted that P could not ‘use or weigh’ the information or 
process the consequences of the decision in accordance with section 3(4). But SB 
gave rational reasons for wanting an abortion that were not related to her paranoia: 
she did not want to have a child in detention or to have a child just to give it up for 
adoption.80  
Can rational reasons be given for refusing treatment for Anorexia Nervosa? 
Ambivalence is a feature of Anorexia Nervosa, with patients typically valuing the 
disorder and wishing to keep it, despite suffering and evidence of harm if they do not 
accept treatment.81 Furthermore, a challenge with severe Anorexia Nervosa is that 
patients are typically articulate, yet may have difficulties in separating an authentic self 
as opposed to a self which is inextricably entwined with the values, wishes and desires 
of Anorexia Nervosa. The attachment to Anorexia Nervosa can be so strong that 
patients may prefer to die than to gain weight, or value the disorder more than life 
itself. As a result, it is important to examine carefully what motivations and reasoning 
underpin P’s expressed wish to live or to die. Thus, the question of whether P’s will to 
die flows from a sense of hopelessness and a desire to end the struggle or alternatively 
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78 Ibid, [34]. 
79 Ibid, [36]. 
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from an articulated preference to die rather than gain weight, is relevant when 
considering P’s ability to use and weigh information.  
There are parallels between Re SB and X, who also ‘made a decision’. Whilst X’s 
perception of her body image and weight were irrational, it is arguable that she also 
gave rational reasons for wanting to avoid further compulsion: X set out her views in 
writing, stating that the therapy was making her worse and: ‘Whatever time I have left 
I just want to live each day alongside my granddad and [siblings], who are my world.’82 
In a recent (as yet unreported) U.S. case, the Morristown County Superior Court in 
New Jersey (a state court with state-wide trial and appellate jurisdiction) ruled that a 
29-year-old woman with SEAN referred to as Ashley G (AG), could not be treated 
against her capacitous decision to refuse food.83 According to media reports, AG had 
previously been treated against her will and suffered heart failure because of refeeding 
syndrome.84 Her Guardian argued that palliative care was appropriate and AG’s 
parents agreed. Tube-feeding would likely result in musculoskeletal injury due to 
osteoporosis. The Department of Human Services and its Division of Mental Health 
and Addiction Services opposed the request but did not appeal the court’s decision. 
As in X’s case, AG understood that non-treatment could result in her death. Judge 
Paul Armstrong stated that her testimony was ‘forthright, responsive, knowing, 
intelligent, voluntary, steadfast and credible’.85 AG retained capacity and, in 
accordance with her wishes, she was transferred to a palliative care unit where she 
died.86 
Based on these five decisions from England and Wales, it is difficult to conceive of a 
case where someone with SEAN would be considered capacitous in relation to 
decisions to refuse food. Peter Jackson J recognised that E was in a Catch 22 
situation: ‘By deciding not to eat, she proves that she lacks capacity to decide at all.’87 
It seems that, by focusing the question on P’s ability to make decisions about nutrition, 
we stray very close to a presumption of incapacity. We would respectfully recommend 
that in future cases, a patient-centred position is used to frame the decision which is 
subject to a capacity assessment. Even if the patient cannot make a capacitous 
decision about nutrition, they may be able to provide rational reasons for refusing 
treatment for Anorexia Nervosa. In such cases, clinicians or the court might accept 
that the patient can make a capacitous decision to do so.   
VI. PARALLELS WITH ASSISTED DYING 
As a brief but relevant aside, it is worth noting that questions surrounding the 
authenticity of treatment decisions made by those with mental disorder are not limited 
to Anorexia Nervosa. There are parallels with debates around assisted dying. 
Internationally, there is evidence of mounting acceptance of the right to assisted 
                                            
82 X NHS Trust v T (adult patient: refusal of medical treatment) [2004] EWHC 1279 (Fam), [51]. 
83 Schmidt S. 2016. Anorexic woman weighing 69 pounds has a right to starve, court rules. Washington 
Post. 22 November: See https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/11/22/anorexic-
woman-weighing-69-pounds-has-a-right-to-starve-court-rules/?utm_term=.08d50a6ef4ca. 
84 Ibid. 
85 King K. 2016. Anorexic can refuse force-feedings, court rules. Wall Street Journal. 21 November. 
See https://www.wsj.com/articles/anorexic-can-refuse-force-feedings-court-rules-1479777914. 
86 Wright P. 2017. Anorexic, bulimic woman who fought force-feeding dies at 30. Associated Press. 22 
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87 Re E (medical treatment: anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP), [53]. 
[2017] International Journal of Mental Health and Capacity Law 
17 
 
suicide.88 In countries where assisted dying is lawful, it is often limited to terminal 
illness and sometimes also to non-terminal but presently incurable degenerative 
conditions, such as motor neuron disease. Conversely both the Netherlands and 
Belgium have recognised that, in principle, patients with non-somatic illness, such as 
clinical depression, are eligible for assisted dying. There are recent reports of a 20-
year-old woman with Anorexia Nervosa accessing assisted dying in the Netherlands,89 
and of UK patients with dementia dying at the Dignitas facility in Zurich.90 Schuklenk 
and van der Vathorst have argued that competent patients who suffer from depressive 
disorders that are treatment-resistant are discriminated against if they are excluded 
from the assistance in dying offered to other groups.91 The battle to ascertain and 
uphold the will of patients with mental disorder is one fought on a number of fronts. 
VII. HOW FAR ARE P’S VIEWS RELEVANT TO AN ASSESSMENT OF BEST 
INTERESTS? 
Given that the courts ruled that E, L, X, W and Z lacked capacity, the decisions turned 
on an assessment of their best interests. This section sets out the applicable test and 
considers the relevance of P’s views. In the cases of L, X, W and Z, the judicial 
decisions coincided with each patient’s stated wishes. It is difficult to discern from the 
cases how far this flowed from an attempt to comply with their will and preferences. 
This section affirms the importance of doing so, but also sounds notes of caution due 
to the difficulties of discerning will and preferences in cases of Anorexia Nervosa and 
the dangers of conflating the two.  
Best interests cannot be defined by a single test.92 A balance sheet approach is often 
used as an ‘aide-mémoire’93 to assist in the weighing of medical and non-medical 
factors set out in section 4 of the MCA.94 In Aintree, Lady Hale recognised the common 
law presumption that it is in P’s best interests to stay alive.95 Whilst there are no 
general principles applicable to when the presumption might be rebutted, there has 
been support for a ‘touchstone of intolerability’96 assessed by a balancing exercise. 
                                            
88 See, for example, Carter v Canada (Attorney General), 2015 SCC 5, [2015] 1 SCR 331. Also Span 
P. 2017. Physician aid in dying gains acceptance in the UK. The New York Times. 16 January: reporting 
new assisted dying legislation in California (June 2016); Colorado (November 2016); Columbia 
(December 2016). See also dissenting judgments of Lady Hale and Lord Kerr in R (Nicklinson) v 
Ministry of Justice; R (on the application of AM) v The Director of Public Prosecutions [2014] UKSC 38. 
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Journal of Medical Ethics 41; 577-583. 
92 R (Burke) v GMC (Official Solicitor intervening) [2005] EWCA Civ 1003, [63] per Lord Phillips. 
93 Re F (A Child) (International Relocation Cases) [2015] EWCA Civ 882, [52] per McFarlane LJ warning 
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94 Re A (male sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549, 560 F-H per Thorpe LJ; W v M and Ors [2011] 1 WLR 
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That exercise requires the decision-maker to consider ‘welfare in the widest sense, 
not just medical but social and psychological’.97 This requires consideration of: 
The nature of the medical treatment in question, what it involves and its prospects of success; 
they must consider what the outcome of that treatment for the patient is likely to be; they must 
try and put themselves in the place of the individual patient and ask what his attitude to the 
treatment is or would be likely to be; and they must consult others who are looking after him or 
interested in his welfare, in particular for their view of what his attitude would be.98 
Lady Hale was clear that whilst the test is objective: ‘The purpose of the best interests 
test is to consider matters from the patient’s point of view’.99 Where P cannot make a 
capacitous decision, then it is necessary to make an assessment of P’s values and 
beliefs, wishes and feelings in order to make ‘the choice which is right for him as an 
individual human being’.100  
This position brings the law closer to compliance with the UN CRPD. Article 12(4) 
views respect for P’s rights, will and preferences, as an integral part of equal 
recognition before the law. In 2017, the Law Commission recommended that P’s 
wishes and feelings should be ascertained and given weight101 and departed from only 
if necessary and proportionate.102  
In the five cases, P’s wishes are central to the analysis of best interests and in each 
case, P consistently and articulately stated a wish to avoid compulsory refeeding. In 
Re E Peter Jackson J said: 
I agree … that particular respect is due to the wishes and feelings of someone who, although 
lacking capacity, is as fully and articulately engaged as E.103 
In Z’s case, voluntary treatment was said to have the best hope of preserving Z’s 
autonomy.104 In each judgment, credence was afforded to P’s views and in principle 
this is to be celebrated. In Briggs v Briggs, Charles J said: 
if the decision that P would have made, and so their wishes on such an intensely personal issue 
can be ascertained with sufficient certainty it should generally prevail over the very strong 
presumption in favour of preserving life.105 
However, Charles J also recognised that the best interests determination is fact 
sensitive and exceptions may apply, for example, where P has previously made 
harmful decisions which the court would be reluctant to make on P’s behalf; where P’s 
current expression of their wishes (such as a desire to leave hospital) fails to factor in 
or weigh competing factors; and where clinical conditions and their effect impact on 
P’s decision-making.106 These factors are highly relevant to the SEAN cases. Anorexia 
Nervosa can undermine autonomy in several ways,107 and though ‘will’ and 
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‘preferences’ are often conflated,108 the SEAN cases serve as a powerful illustration 
of how the two might clash. There may, for example, be a stated preference (not to 
eat) that conflicts with an authentic will (to live); a current preference contradictory to 
a past preference; or the Anorexia Nervosa might itself influence or generate a 
willingness to die (though not usually a wish to die) that flows from the desire to be 
thin, in which case P’s ‘rights’ may conflict with both P’s will and preferences.  
Coggon persuasively argues that, where possible, the same weight should be given 
to P’s wishes and feelings when P lacks capacity as when P retains it.109 The MCA 
requires by section 4(6) that consideration is given, as far as is reasonably 
ascertainable,110 to P’s past and present wishes and feelings, beliefs and values. As 
Coggon acknowledges, difficulties arise where P has expressed conflicting views. 
Does a past capacitous view take precedence over a current incapacitous view? 
Section 4 of the MCA gives little guidance as to how to deal with conflict between past 
and present wishes. In SEAN cases, it may not be clear whether P ever possessed 
the relevant insight into their condition such that P could make a capacitous decision 
about nutrition. There was some acknowledgment of this in Z’s case: Having 
considered the ‘broader canvass’ of Z’s life,111 Hayden J concluded: ‘Sadly, in this 
case that has proved to be a very short exercise. Z's world, since she was 15 years of 
age, has been entirely circumscribed by her eating disorder.’112  
Analysing Cheshire & Wirral Ptnr NHS FT v Z, Clough convincingly demonstrates that 
consideration of will and preferences must go beyond a mere consideration of the 
issue of nutrition.113 As we have seen, all five patients wanted to avoid a coercive 
regime, but whilst E and X wanted to be allowed to die with dignity114 L, W and Z 
expressed a hope and desire to live. L felt that if funding were secured to enable her 
to move to a nursing home, she would survive.115 W wanted to return to education and 
pursue a career.116 Z believed that, if allowed to return home, she would survive.117 
Given the conflicting nature of the desire to live and the desire to avoid compulsory 
refeeding, it is unclear in L, W and Z’s cases which should take priority.  
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Just as we have argued that the capacity assessment should look beyond the narrow 
issue of nutrition, so too, where P lacks capacity, the best interests assessment should 
extend beyond that narrow focus. The danger inherent in the five cases is twofold. 
Firstly, it is not clear that a sufficiently nuanced consideration of best interests was 
undertaken. Secondly, it is possible that the cases may be misconstrued in practice 
and that patients shown (or assumed) to lack capacity will nonetheless be given the 
choice to refuse treatment. Unless a suitably nuanced consideration of will and 
preferences is undertaken, there is potential in clinical practice to assume that the 
stated preferences of the patient represent their best interests where, in some cases, 
in-patient treatment might still be appropriate and potentially efficacious.  
VIII. TREATMENT UTILITY AND FUTILITY 
In England and Wales, the issue of treatment efficacy - that is, how effective a 
proposed treatment is likely to be in the opinion of the clinician - influences clinicians’ 
choices between two different but overlapping legal regimes: The Mental Capacity Act 
2005 and the Mental Health Act 1983. We have shown that there is much debate as 
to the efficacy of treatment in cases of SEAN and this section explores the impact of 
that uncertainty. 
Mental Health Act 
As we have seen, in-patient treatment under the MHA 1983 does not necessarily 
require patient consent. A minimum requirement is that the treatment does not violate 
Article 3 of the ECHR, which prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment. Compulsory 
treatment violates Article 3 unless shown to be in P’s best interests on the basis that 
a ‘medical necessity has been convincingly shown to exist’.118 In R (N) v (M) the test 
for necessity was said to include: 
(a) how certain is it that the patient does suffer from a treatable mental disorder; (b) how serious 
a disorder is it; (c) how serious a risk is presented to others; (d) how likely is it that, if the patient 
does suffer from such a disorder, the proposed treatment will alleviate the condition; (e) how 
much alleviation is there likely to be; (f) how likely is it that the treatment will have adverse 
consequences for the patient; and (g) how severe may they be.119 
Where the treatment decision is made by clinicians under the MHA framework, the 
first factor listed in R (N) v (M) is affected by a revision of the MHA in 2007, which 
replaced the requirement of treatability with one of ‘appropriate’ treatment.120 This 
affords clinicians significant discretion. How the discretion is exercised will depend, in 
part, on the clinician’s position on whether the particular case of Anorexia Nervosa can 
and should be classified as ‘severe and enduring’ and the effect they believe this has 
on treatment efficacy. Clinicians who consider the disorder to be a chronic condition 
might see value in continued treatment. The MHA Code of Practice recognises that 
for some patients, management rather than cure is ‘all that can be hoped for’.121 In 
common with many mental health disorders, eating disorders cannot always be cured 
                                            
118 Herczegfalvy v Austria [1993] 15 EHRR 437, 484; Re E (medical treatment: anorexia) [2012] EWHC 
1639 (COP), [126]. 
119 [2002] EWCA Civ 1789, [19] per Dyson LJ. 
120 Mental Health Act 1983 s 58(3)(b), as amended by the MHA 2007. See Bartlett P. 2011. Standards 
for compulsory treatment for mental disorder under the Mental Health Act 1983. Medical Law Review 
19(4): 514-547. 
121 Department of Health. 2015. Mental Health Act 1983 Code of Practice. TSO, paras 6.15-6.16. 
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and a diagnosis may be life-long. In these cases, treatment under the MHA might 
continue. On the other hand, some, who accept that a case is severe and enduring, 
will also accept that compulsory treatment is no longer efficacious, in which case it 
may no longer be apposite to treat under the MHA. Media reports of the U.S. case of 
AG, discussed above, go so far as to classify that case of Anorexia Nervosa as a ‘late 
terminal’ condition.  
Mental Capacity Act: Cure or management? 
If treatment is no longer considered appropriate under the MHA, the MCA regime 
remains relevant. In Briggs, Charles J recognised that P’s views might not be followed 
if P wants something that ‘is not an available option’.122 In the five SEAN cases, P was 
not requesting, but refusing, treatment. Still, the perceived utility or futility of the 
treatment options is pertinent: A refusal of something that would not be offered needs 
little by way of justification. The right to life enshrined in Article 2 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights is not absolute123 and the best interests test goes wider 
than medical necessity124 to encompass the value of treatment.125 In Aintree, Lady 
Hale made it clear that futility must be assessed against the wide interests of the 
patient; treatment is not futile if it brings benefit to the patient, even if it does not 
improve the underlying medical condition.126  
Unfortunately, the cases evince dicta suggestive of a more limited view of the purpose 
of treatment. When combined with a narrow focus on P’s expressed views, the 
judgments form a powerful incentive for clinicians to release objecting SEAN patients 
from in-patient treatment programmes. The dicta in question focus on cure as the 
purpose of treatment. In W’s case, it was said that interventions had for some time 
merely kept her alive rather than addressed the underlying condition.127 To keep P on 
the unit or move P to another unit was considered cruel given the restrictions it would 
involve and the remoteness of any prospects for change.128 In X’s case, too, it was 
established that the purpose of refeeding was not simply to avert the risk of death, but 
rather to treat the underlying conditions. The purpose was for X: 
i) to gain weight,  
ii) more importantly to gain insight into the benefits of psychotherapeutic interventions to address 
the causes of her illnesses, and then  
iii) yet more crucially still, to avail herself of those psychotherapeutic interventions.129 
The conclusion in X’s case was that: ‘Any refeeding treatment would not now, as it 
never has, address the cause of the Anorexia Nervosa; it would merely serve to 
prolong life’.130 In Z’s case, the judge concluded that discharge from the MHA 
                                            
122 Briggs v Briggs [2016] EWCOP 53, [60]. 
123 Re E (medical treatment: anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP), [120] and The NHS Trust v L and 
Others [2012] EWHC 2741 (COP), [18] citing Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789. 
124 Re S (sterilisation: patient's best interests) [2000] 2 FLR 389. 
125 Office of the Public Guardian. 2013 (updated 2016). MCA Code of Practice, 5.31. 
126 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, [40], [44] per Lady 
Hale. 
127 Re W (medical treatment: anorexia) [2016] EWCOP 13, [38]. 
128 Ibid [40]. 
129 A NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X (Official Solicitor) [2014] EWCOP 35, [41] per Cobb J. 
130 Ibid [43].  
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framework and treatment on a voluntary basis ‘is ultimately the only proposal which 
carries any vestige of hope and most effectively preserves Z's dignity and 
autonomy’.131 
Coggon argues that the concept of the treatment decision needs further evaluation.132 
The narrow view of the purpose of treatment is potentially at odds with Lady Hale’s 
assertion in Aintree that: ‘[I]t is setting the goal too high to say that treatment is futile 
unless it has ‘a real prospect of curing or at least palliating the life-threatening disease 
or illness from which the patient is suffering’.133  
We have suggested above that the decision against which capacity is assessed should 
encompass P’s decision surrounding the value of further treatment. We would further 
argue that this approach should extend to best interests assessments so as to take 
account of whether a short- or long-term view of the purpose of treatment is relevant 
to P. A short-term view may be relevant in cases where the prognosis is poor but 
prolonged life coincides with the patient’s will or values.134 It might also be relevant to 
a SEAN case if there is evidence that refeeding could enhance capacity (by reducing 
the adverse effects of physical frailty or sedative drugs); or that refeeding might lead 
to a more positive engagement with services, family or education, even if the evidence 
suggests that P might later relapse. The closer we come to assessing futility of 
treatment options against the goal of complete cure, the easier it will be to 
demonstrate. This may be failing P if it coincides with their stated preference but not 
their will or values and their desire to live. 
IX. CONCLUSION
The judges in the decisions of E, L, X, W, and Z carefully and compassionately 
considered the patients’ wishes. In four of the cases they granted the declarations 
sought by the NHS Trusts to cease compulsory treatment in compliance with the 
wishes of each P, with the support of their families and clinicians.  
This paper has focussed on the human rights implications of the judgments in law and 
clinical practice. It is important to acknowledge that the judges operated under several 
constraints. Firstly, they were limited by the options put to them by the clinical team. 
There is no general power to decide how clinicians should treat a patient.135 Secondly, 
the courts were powerless to affect the timing of the decisions. NHS Trusts are advised 
to bring a claim only once a structured assessment has taken place,136 but by the time 
the cases of E, L, X, W and Z came to court, the condition of each of the patients was 
dire.137 Finally, the question of resources is an ever-present undercurrent.138 NICE has 
131 Cheshire & Wirral Ptnr NHS FT v Z [2016] EWCOP 56, [19] per Hayden J. 
132 Coggon J. 2015. Alcohol dependence and anorexia nervosa: Individual autonomy and the jurisdiction 
of the Court of Protection: An NHS Foundation Trust v Ms X [2014] EWCOP 35. Medical Law Review 
23; 659-67. 
133 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, [43]. 
134 See for example St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v P&Q [2015] EWCOP 42. 
135 Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67, [18] per Lady Hale. 
136 St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v P&Q [2015] EWCOP 42. 
137 See Re E (medical treatment: anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP), [40]. And on importance of 
timing of application more generally, see Sandwell and West Birmingham Hospitals NHS Trust v CD 
[2014] EWCOP 23. 
138 But see Re E (medical treatment: anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP), [143]: ‘I record that the state, 
having instigated this plan of action for E in the way that it has, is now honour bound to see it through 
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acknowledged that ‘eating disorders, in particular Anorexia Nervosa, result in 
substantial economic burdens upon healthcare resources’.139 Clinicians must consider 
the resource implications of on-going treatment, just as treatment availability or lack 
thereof140 may have paradoxically contributed to the severe and enduring nature of 
the condition now suffered by the patient.  
Operating within these constraints, it may yet be possible in future cases to subject a 
clinical view that P lacks capacity to greater scrutiny. This would allow judges to 
enhance protection of P’s autonomy rights and to provide valuable practical guidance 
for clinicians. We have made three principal recommendations that aim to put the 
rights, will and preferences of P at the heart of decision-making: 
(1) The court should resist appointing the same expert in all cases. In a clinical setting, 
a plurality of views exists on the staging and classification of Anorexia Nervosa, 
prognosis of patients with SEAN, their capacity, the choice between Mental Capacity 
Act or Mental Health Act regimes, and ultimately their best interests. Understood as a 
potentially terminal condition, the focus might be on when to stop treatment and focus 
on palliative management. Understood as a treatable or indeed chronic condition, the 
focus will be on refusal of refeeding in which case, even if capacitous, P’s refusal might 
be overruled under the MHA framework on the basis that appropriate treatment and 
prospect of recovery or continued life with reasonable quality exists.  
(2) A patient-centred assessment of capacity will flexibly interpret the decision about 
which capacity is assessed by reference to the patient’s views on the value of 
treatment. A patient who lacks capacity to make a decision about nutrition may have 
capacity to determine that treatment is no longer worthwhile.  
(3) Where it is found that P lacks capacity, and the Court of Protection is asked to 
determine best interests, the Court should seek to identify P’s views, contrasting 
current and past views; rights, will and preferences. Exclusive focus on P’s expressed 
views on refeeding risks reliance on stated preferences that can potentially clash with 
P’s will (as, for example when P refuses food but desires to live). This is particularly 
troublesome when P’s (unauthentic) views of futility coincide with a clinical view that 
treatment of SEAN has become futile, or with a judicial assessment of the 
appropriateness of treatment against the goal of cure rather than management of the 
disorder. Where P expresses views about the value and purpose of treatment, these 
views are relevant to the best interests assessment. Where they constitute an 
authentic expression of P’s will, they will guide clinicians and the court in determining 
best interests from P’s point of view.141 
Though the judgments do not promote such a broad-brush approach, a focus on the 
outcomes of the five cases in combination might lead to an assumption, in clinical 
practice, that P cannot make a capacitous decision in relation to the treatment of 
SEAN, and, where a lengthy programme of intervention has not addressed the 
by the provision of resources in the short, medium and long term. Had the authorities not made that 
commitment, I would not have reached the conclusion that I have.’ 
139 NICE. Draft: Eating Disorders - Recognition and Treatment. [GID-CGWAVE0703], p 35. 
140 NHS Confederation, Mental Health Network. 2016. Funding for Mental Health. 15 June: Reports a 
£600m real-term fall in NHS mental health funding over the course of the last parliament. See 
http://www.nhsconfed.org/resources/2016/06/funding-for-mental-health 
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underlying condition, that further compulsory treatment might be considered futile. This 
can and should be avoided. Palliative management should be based on need rather 
than diagnosis; capacity should be decision- and not disease-specific.    
